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Abstract
The opinion of  many feminist thinkers and process theologians 
has been that Christianity needs to shed its allegiance to a God conceived 
in terms of  omnipotent sovereignty. As an alternative, many of  them 
have envisioned God in more relational categories, focusing on the 
metaphysically	“limited”	nature	of 	God,	with	the	first	step	along	this	path	
often being a refutation of  the traditional doctrine of  creatio ex nihilo. This 
essay summarizes such critiques before proceeding to argue that a robust 
understanding of  creatio ex nihilo, viewed through the lens of  kenosis, can 
actually speak more	effectively	to	God’s	relational	nature	and	sacrificial	love.	
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Introduction
A billboard down the street from where I teach recently advertised 
for a Christian ministry seeking to help young people understand what 
loving relationships ought to look like. Emblazoned in vivid typeface, the 
billboard asks us to consider the following question: Is it love, or control? It 
is interesting that, in a century sporting an acute resurgence of  trinitarian 
theology, spurred by the likes of  Barth and Rahner, we are consistently 
being pushed to consider a similar question: What is the relationship 
between God’s ability to control the world (via his great power) and God’s 
love for the world? 
Trinitarian theology has taught us to view God more relationally 
and to view ourselves in relational categories as bearers of  God’s image. The 
natural sciences and quantum physics present to us a corresponding picture, 
that all of  nature partakes of  ecosystems within ecosystems, thriving and 
changing in the midst of  other entities and phenomena. More and more 
as such study continues we realize that “there is no such thing as solitary 
life. Contrary to Leibniz’s view every monad has many windows, in actual 
fact	it	consists	only	of 	windows.	All	living	things—each	in	its	own	specific	
way—live in one another and with one another, from one another and for 
one another” (Moltmann 1985:17). This recognition has illuminated not 
only our study of  humanity, but also of  ethics.1 “Postmodern” philosophy 
in particular has proclaimed a needed move away from metaphysical 
dogmatics and binaries, and toward a focus on the actuality of  lived, 
communal personhood. These concerns, among many Christian scholars, 
have found a home as inspiration for constructive theological work.2
 No system or methodology has been more enamored with this 
vision of  an “interrelated” and “organic” reality than process theology. A.N. 
Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne championed subjective, experiential 
categories, presenting a relational vision of  God that could operate 
in	 consonance	 with	 scientific	 discourse	 (Whitehead	 1929;	 Hartshorne	
1976,1978,1982). Process theology’s rigorous focus on metaphysics make it 
an unlikely bedfellow for the anti-ontology strains of  postmodern thought, 
but their mutual concern with “otherness” (alterity), plurality, and dynamism 
has led to an allegiance of  sorts, with scholars like Catherine Keller and 
David	Ray	Griffin	partaking	of 	post-structuralism,	post-colonialism,	and	
process	 thought	 in	 their	 theological	 forays	 (Keller	 2002,2011;	 Griffin	
samuel J. youngs: creatio ex amore Dei    167
2003). Indeed, the champions of  deconstruction and counter-metaphysical 
speculation—“Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Derrida, and Deleuze”—have 
now been recognized to “share many points and concerns with Alfred 
North	Whitehead”	(Griffin	2003:viii).	Schubert	Ogden	presaged	the	point,	
referencing Heideggerian philosophy and Whitehead:
 
As not only Whitehead, but also Heidegger and others have 
made clear, the characteristics of  classical philosophy all 
derive from its virtually exclusive orientation away from 
the primal phenomenon of  selfhood toward the secondary 
phenomenon constituted by the experience of  our senses... As 
soon	 as	we	orient	 our	metaphysical	 reflection	 to	 the	 self 	 as	
we actually experience it, as itself  the primal ground of  our 
world of  perceived objects, this whole classical approach is, 
in the Heideggerian sense of  the word, ‘dismantled’ (destruiert) 
(1977:57-58).
Process	thought	and	postmodern	theology	have	had	parallel	influences	on	
liberation theologies, feminist varieties in particular.3 These voices, though 
divergent in peripherals, converge over core convictions, namely that the 
God of  the Judeo-Christian tradition has too long been conceived in terms 
of  unbridled power, transcendence, and sovereignty, granting humanity 
not only an impoverished, tyrannical view of  deity, but also of  that deity’s 
relationship to the world. God’s omnipotence, and doctrines relating to it, 
has come under the most strenuous of  the resultant censures. To be sure, our 
ever-rising awareness and sensitivity to the problem of  evil has exacerbated 
such denunciations of  God’s omnipotence (often, understandably, with 
the intent to shield God from responsibility for the evil in the world), but 
from process and feminist thinkers in particular, “prevailing concepts of  
omnipotence are problematic in themselves, even prior to consideration of  
the problem of  evil” (Case-Winters 1990:7).4 According to such theologies, 
this “emperor” vision of  God, which Charles Hartshorne termed “classical 
theism,” must be done away with, along with its attendant doctrines, in 
particular creation out of  nothing (Keller 2003:41-100; Hartshorne 
1978:75-80). Indeed: “Process theology [and theologies associated with it] 
rejects the notion of  creatio ex nihilo… That doctrine is part and parcel of  the 
doctrine	of 	God	as	absolute	controller”	(Cobb	&	Griffin	1976:65).	David	
Fergusson has likewise remarked that both feminist and process theologies 
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tend to react directly against aspects of  the Judeo-Christian tradition that 
have over-emphasized God’s transcendence (1998:2). Thus, a God whose 
creative	act	is	defined	by	power	and	who	creates	solely	out	of 	his	will	for	
the sake of  self, is reproached by these perspectives. 
 These introductory summations serve to ground what I now say, 
and that is that I agree with these thinkers’ critique—to a certain extent. If  
our	understanding	of 	creation	does	not	reflect	the	relational	heart	of 	our	
trinitarian God—in whom “we live and move and have our being”—then 
we	might	need	to	admit	that	this	aspect	of 	our	theological	reflection	stands	
in need of  further development.5 
But this essay’s contention is not that God’s nature and character 
are	 better	 reflected	 by	 a	 rejection	 of 	 creatio ex nihilo. Rather, I’d like to 
propose that it is through a theologically nuanced and philosophically 
attuned	understanding	of 	creation	out	of 	nothing	that	God’s	sacrificial	and	
other-centered, self-giving love may be most clearly seen. Instead of  the 
God of  absolute control that process theists so fear, this traditional doctrine 
might actually be able to open doors for understanding God’s relational 
nature more fully. After all, apart from the cosmological questions there is 
also the “theological question” of  creation: “What does this creation mean 
for God?” (Moltmann 1985:72). It is this question that will be explored, by 
arguing that creation out of  nothing is a kenotic act,	and	as	such	exemplifies	
an	affirmation	of 	 the	other,	 as	well	 as	 self-giving	 love,	more	deeply	 and	
consistently than the alternative views offered by revisionist theologies. 
In order to consider what such a kenotic view of  creation might mean, 
this paper will investigate and defend some aspects of  the notions of  
“nothing(ness),” “freedom/power,” and “divine self-limitation.”
 
The Nature of  Nothing
As has been argued, convincingly, to my mind, creation out of  
nothing can be readily derived from biblical texts, conjoined sensibly with 
other cardinal doctrines, and perceived to underlie the thought of  the most 
significant	 theological	 minds	 (Copan	 &	 Craig	 2004;	 Peters	 1988;	 Barth	
1960:152f.; Copan 2005; Siniscalchi 2013:678-681), resonating with verve 
from the writings of  Irenaeus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Anselm.6 Although 
the doctrine is nowhere explicitly taught within scripture—as Gerard 
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May states, “[creation out of  nothing] was not demanded by the text of  
the	 Bible”	 (1994:24)—	we	 can	 affirm	 that	 it	 is,	 in	 the	words	 of 	 Jürgen	
Moltmann,	a	“fitting”	concept	for	 the	biblical	understanding	of 	creation	
(1985:74).
But as a conceptual label, the notion only takes us so far: “[It] 
prompts	 still	 other	 questions.	How	 are	 we	 to	 define	 this	 nihil, which is 
supposed	to	deny	and	exclude	everything	that	has	definition?”	(Moltmann	
1985:74). How can we theologically render this nothingness? Does such a 
conception contain anything of  substance to render? Nothingness, even as 
a noun, might be etymologically oxymoronic, for to assign an identity to 
a complete lack of  identity certainly seems to be contravening the whole 
force of  the idea. Aquinas’ conception of  this nothing was so absolute that 
it disbarred any idea of  “succession or even motion” (Richard 1997:130f.). 
We must, it seems, resist the urge to see the pre-existent Godhead 
as anything other than the only thing. In the pre-creation, there was only 
the immanence of  God with Godself—God was not previously existing 
anywhere, for there was nowhere, no place, no locus, no anything that was not 
God, in which he might have been existing. Sergius Bulgakov states of  this 
absolute and total singularity of  God’s existence, “It is not even a void, since 
a void is conceived as a receptacle, that is, as a bounded, concrete being. 
There is only God, and outside of  and apart from God there is nothing, 
just as there is not even any “outside of ” or “apart from.”… nothing is a 
relative concept; it is correlative with something, that is, with already existing” 
(2008:124-125).	 Fully	 reflecting	 on	 this	 notion	 can	 cause	 something	 like	
intellectual indigestion; it begins to disagree with us. Our words here betray 
our concepts. For, how can the world “come into being,” if  the only being 
for it to come into is God’s being? If  the world is going to be distinct 
from the creator, as indeed it must if  we are going to avoid Hegelianism 
and process thought,7 then the world needs a distinct placement from the 
creator. Said another way, if  the only “spot” for creation is “within” God, 
since God is all that is, then it would seem that another “spot” would need 
to be made for that creation to inhabit as a distinct ontological entity from 
its creator. To preserve the creator-creature distinction, we have to able 
to say something about this, or risk total incoherence in our theology of  
creation—in the face of  which revisionist responses may resound their 
defeat of  the ex nihilo view.
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 Moltmann has, in the face of  the foregoing dilemma, famously 
posited the mystical notion of  zimzum, which he pilfers from Kabbalah as 
a kind of  conceptual tool for understanding the metaphysics of  creation. 
In essence, Moltmann claims that in order to “make room” for creation, 
God withdraws himself, fences himself  off, in order to create a void, a 
nihil, into which creation can be spoken: “The existence of  a world outside 
God is made possible by an inversion of  God. This sets free a kind of  
‘mystical primordial space’ into which God—issuing out of  himself—can 
enter and in which he can manifest himself…. Creation is preceded by this 
self-movement of  God’s part, a movement which allows creation the space 
for its own being. God withdraws himself  in order to go out of  himself ” 
(1985:108-111).8
 God creates a non-God space by—and here’s the key—self-
limitation. It is in this light that we can start to perceive creation as a kenotic 
act on the part of  God. Lucien Richard follows Moltmann’s point, saying, 
“Creation involves a costly process. Creation is an act of  kenotic love,” 
(1997:136) highlighting the difference between this sort of  thinking about 
creation and thinking which focuses solely on God’s transcendence, glory, 
and omnipotence.9 But again, and this is the point, God’s willingness (we 
might say “desire”) to limit himself  by the establishment of  an “other” 
(that is, the created order, an entity utterly distinct from himself) is most 
thoroughly	 exemplified	 by	 a	 creation	 ex nihilo perspective. After all, if  
God were already “one among others,” eternally existing alongside chaos 
or pre-existent materia,	 then	 there	would	 be	 no	metaphysical	 sacrifice	 to	
compromise his status as the lone-existing absolute. Indeed, Emil Brunner 
too	recognized	that	“when	God	permitted	creation,	this	was	the	first	act	of 	
the divine self-humiliation which reached its profoundest point in the cross 
of  Christ” (Moltmann 1985:87; Brunner 1952:20).10
Now, it should be noted that Moltmann’s articulations of  
zimzum have struck a few as needlessly mystical and apocryphal additions 
to a “rightly Christian” understanding of  creation.11  (I do not know 
that	Moltmann	 ever	 expected	 such	 reflections	 to	 be	 taken	 dogmatically,	
but more as useful intellectual—and possibly metaphorical—tools for 
understanding.) We should also note that though Moltmann is a compelling 
theologian of  great resource, it has been understood that an understanding 
of  creation as a kenotic act does not necessarily entail his panentheism. 
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John Polkinghorne, who agrees strongly with the conception of  creation 
as a kenotic act, writes, “The problem [with panentheism] then lies in the 
danger that such a view compromises the world’s freedom to be itself, 
which God has given to his creation, and also the otherness that he retains 
for himself.[…] There are distinctions between God and the world that 
Christian theology cannot afford to blur” (Polkinghorne 2005:28; also 
1996:32).	Such	qualifications	made,	we	should	not	miss	the	core	point:	a	
creation out of  nothing, understood as power-to-create exercised in love 
for the sake of  another reality, opens up vast theological space for us to talk 
about a genuine, interactive, and relational heavenly Father. 
But this must be understood in its full theological range and 
significance.	In	giving	rise	to	and	creating	in	the	midst	of 	this	nihil, God has 
brought about a not-God reality—which functions, both metaphysically 
and formally, as a limitation that God has self-imposed. Before this moment, 
all that was was God. But then, in the pulsing heart of  the creative act, 
something (the space for creation and creation itself) is birthed which is 
not God. God is now in relationship with something beyond his Godhead; 
he is related externally, now looking beyond the constitutive relationships 
of  his trinitarian glory toward something else, something other. This core 
insight	can	be	understood	as	a	kind	of 	sacrifice.	In	engaging	in	this	freely	
determined act of  creating, God not only makes a space where he is not, 
but gifts the dignity of  existence and relationship with the Almighty to 
another—and in so doing opens himself  to the drama of  human sinfulness, 
which	eventually	leads	to	the	sacrifice	of 	the cross,	the	apex	of 	that	sacrificial	
love that was begun in this primordial moment.12 
 As the apostle Paul tells us, the power of  the cross is that strange 
power, that “foolish,” “low,” “despised,” and “weak” power (1 Corinthians 
1:18-29). Indeed, God’s power is not just exemplified in weakness, but made 
perfect in it (2 Corinthians 12:9). Yet, as we’ve noted, creation out of  nothing 
is often discussed in terms of  exemplifying God’s omnipotence—and 
roundly critiqued within that light as lauding God’s controlling power at 
the expense of  more relational understandings (Caputo 2006:80-87). As 
Sally McFague puts it: “Out of  nothing’ (ex nihilo) is not in Genesis or 
even in the Bible… Rather, it is an invention of  the early church fathers 
to underscore the transcendence of  God. But, we might ask does it also 
allow for divine immanence, as an adequate model of  God and the world 
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should?” (1993:152).13 Such concerns should not be brushed aside.  We 
thus need to examine what a kenotic understanding of  creation might mean 
for our articulations of  God’s power.
The Power of  God’s Freedom
 Per Copan and Craig, creation ex nihilo safeguards and promotes 
three core theological convictions: namely, God’s aseity, God’s freedom, and 
God’s omnipotence (2004:25-26). All of  these have been critiqued to varying 
degrees by postmodern and process theists, but none have been targeted so 
stridently	as	omnipotence	(e.g.	Hartshorne	1978;	Case-Wintes	1990;	Griffin	
1976). Copan and Craig discuss omnipotence in not unfamiliar terms: “If  
God desired to create, but could only create out of  preexisting matter, then 
this would place a limitation on God” (2004:25). Karl Barth made a similar 
point:
Creation is the freely willed and executed positing of  a reality 
distinct from God. The question thus arises: What was and 
is the will of  God in doing this? We may reply that he does 
not will to be alone in His glory; that he desires something 
else beside Him. But this answer cannot mean that God 
either willed or did it for no purpose, or that He did so to 
satisfy a need. Nor does it mean that He did not will to be and 
remain alone because He could not do so… In constituting this 
[created] reality He cannot have set a limit to His glory, will and power 
(1958:III.1.231-232).
Everything here from Barth resonates with our kenotic understanding of  
creation	so	far…	except	the	last	sentence.	A	kenosis,	a	sacrifice,	a	work	of 	
real	love,	would	seemingly	need	to	be	defined	by	limitation.	The	whole	logic	
of  God enacting a particular reality, and not some other reality, and choosing 
to work through certain individuals at specific points in history, indicates that 
God is actually constantly working in the midst of  self-imposed limitations. 
Such is the logic of  any enacted choice—indeed, every freely pursued 
action both empowers in the decision for what is chosen and limits in the 
direction of  that reality which is not enacted. Once something is chosen 
not to be done, then a limit around that action has been erected. This limit 
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is by no means a negative, and logically it is no diminishment of  God’s 
power. It means only that God is limited to do whatever God wants to do 
in any given situation—thus preventing God from having to do something 
other than what he wants to do. God’s hand cannot be forced; divine 
activity is completely and utterly free from constraint: “God’s almighty 
power is demonstrated only inasmuch as all the operations of  that power 
are determined by his eternal nature itself. God therefore does what for him 
is axiomatic—what is divine. In doing this he is entirely free, and in this 
freedom he is entirely himself. This excludes all forms of  duress. But it also 
does away with any apparent arbitrariness” (Moltmann 1985:76).
 The notion of  God self-limiting as a matter of  divine prerogative 
is constitutive of  the mainstream theological tradition of  Christianity. It is 
even	present,	perhaps	conflictingly,	in	Barth,	who,	as	we	saw,	claimed	that	
God imposes no limits on himself, and yet “resolves” to bring about a 
particular world. But this particularity, by virtue of  it being a choice, excludes 
other possible particularities—and, in fact, this self-imposed limitation 
comes after another such limiting choice: the decision to create at all.14
     
[God] determines that he will be the world’s Creator… God 
commits himself  to create a world. If  creation is viewed under 
the aspect of  a divine resolve of  will, God’s determination that 
he will be the Creator of  a world could already imply a self-
limitation on God’s part in favor of  this particular one of  his 
innumerable possibilities. The Reformed doctrine of  decrees 
presented creation under the aspect of  the creative resolve, 
and Karl Barth developed this (Moltmann 1985:80).
The foregoing discussion, however, is intended to prevent us 
from saying things like “God’s omnipotence means that God is not affected 
by anything other than God,” which contains an illogical force. Although 
it	may	strike	us	as	a	conceptual	difficulty	at	first,	relational	limitations	are	
not	opposed	to	God’s	majesty.	Such	limitations	are	sacrificial,	but	again,	a	
faith articulated in light of  the cross would not expect a wide gulf  to exist 
between	God’s	glory	and	the	notion	of 	sacrifice;	we	must	articulate	all	of 	
our theology in light of  “Jesus, crowned with glory and honor because of  
the suffering of  death” (Hebrews 2:9-10, see also Luke 24:26; 1 Peter 1:11, 
4:13). The importance of  such a point can hardly be overstressed.
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 Now, there is an understandable and quite orthodox suspicion 
of  anything that implies any lack or need in God that originates from 
outside of  God’s will. Process thought and related schools often posit 
such a needy deity: God needed the world in order to be God, or “God 
would not be God without the world,” or sometimes it is even said that the 
world “completes God.” Against this sort of  thinking, it is instructive to 
note that Moltmann critiques the fact that in its rejection of  creatio ex nihilo, 
process theology has collapsed the distinction between the created order 
and the Creator, so that “the theology of  nature becomes a divinization of  
nature” (1985:78-79).15 Bulgakov is even clearer in his disagreement with 
such	 views:	 “God’s	 freedom	 in	 the	 creation	 of 	 the	world	 signifies…the	
absence of  a determinate necessity for Him as a need for Him to develop 
or complete Himself ” (2008:120).16	God	has	no	desperate	need	to	be	filled-
up by the world—the world is “God’s gift” and the universe is “absolutely 
dependent” on God for its existence (Richard 1997:120).17
	 But	 we	 can	 affirm	 the	 world’s	 absolute	 dependence	 on	 God	
and	 God’s	 sufficiency	 apart	 from	 the	 world	 without	 speaking	 of 	
creation as a boundless exercise of  power. Power of  the omnipotent 
variety is a concept deserving of  constructive analysis. For my reading 
on the subject, Hans Jonas is still the most instructive and challenging: 
From the very concept of  power, it follows that 
omnipotence [as traditionally construed] is self-
contradictory…. Absolute, total power means power 
not limited by anything, not even by the mere existence 
of  something other than the possessor of  that power; 
for the very existence of  such another would already 
constitute a limitation, and the one would have to 
annihilate it so as to save its absoluteness. Absolute 
power then, in its solitude, has no object on which to 
act. But as object-less power it is a powerless power, 
canceling itself  out: “all” equals “zero” here…. The 
existence of  another object limits the power of  the most 
powerful agent at the same time that it allows it to be an 
agent. In brief, power as such is a relational concept and 
requires relation (1987:8).
Arguing aggressively that absolute power without any restriction whatsoever 
is logically untenable, Jonas claims that relationship both makes sense of  
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and naturally limits power. It is this truth that Bulgakov claims represents 
the “metaphysical kenosis” of  creation (2008:128).18 The logical force of  
this assertion is strong, but shines through even more clearly if  we grant 
that the image of  God, not to mention the creation mandate and human 
responsibility in general, constitute what Terrence Fretheim calls “divine 
power-sharing,” wherein God’s purposes are carried out in tandem with 
the willing and acting of  human persons (1984:75).19 God willingly shares 
his power; all power is God’s to give, but he has gifted his creatures with 
far more than just existence; he has given them power to act meaningfully 
within that existence, helping us make sense of  St. Paul’s assurance that 
“we are God’s co-workers” (1 Corinthians 3:9, see also 2 Corinthians 6:1). 
This	biblical	underscoring	of 	God’s	relational	stance	toward	us	affirms	that	
God is not unwilling to work out his purposes with this shared power and 
influence,	granting	human	beings	what	C.S.	Lewis	(quoting	Pascal)	called	
“the dignity of  causality” (1972:104-107). Recognized in another way by 
Paul Copan, God’s relational nature means that he is not afraid to work 
through	“inefficient	means,”	which	can	be	thought	of 	as	humans	less-than-
ideally using the power he has gifted them with (2011:69,165-167). God 
being	entirely	free,	yet	in	that	freedom	choosing	to	limit	himself 	exemplifies	
this	sacrificial—or	kenotic—relation	to	humanity.	It	is	to	this	self-limiting	
capability of  the divine freedom that we now turn.
“The Sphere Which God Does Not Overstep”: Divine Self-Limitation
 The notion of  divine self-limitation (DSL), presented explicitly 
and implicitly in my two foregoing sections on the relational nature of  a 
kenotic	 creation,	 is	 not	without	 its	 conceptual	 and	 logical	 difficulties.	A	
robust	assessment	of 	such	difficulties	cannot	be	broached	here,	but	I	will	
briefly	 remark	 on	 some	 objections	 that	 have	 come	 from	 the	 revisionist	
philosophical theologies that have here concerned us. 20 Anna Case-Winters 
and	 David	 Ray	 Griffin	 will	 serve	 as	 helpful	 commentators	 here.	 Both	
have written standout works which are critical of  divine omnipotence and 
both are at-home within more revisionist paradigms (feminist and process 
theology) which have always rejected creatio ex nihilo.
	 Case-Winters	finds	serious	problems	with	what	she	calls	“classical	
models” of  divine power, for which she takes Calvin as the pre-eminent 
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example. Not least among her critical points is the fact that “such a[n 
understanding	 of 	 omnipotence]	makes	 difficult	 any	 concept	 of 	 genuine	
relationship between God and the world—which in the ordinary meaning of  
the word would entail mutuality and reciprocity” (1990:92). These points 
carry considerable weight, and are the same sorts of  observations that have 
led many thinkers (myself  included) to value the notion of  God’s free self-
limitation, which accounts for a more genuine relate-ability to creation.
 Looking then to the doctrine of  omnipotence as presented by 
Barth, Case-Winters notes the appearance of  the notion that God can 
limit himself  without contradicting his own omnipotence. Barth holds that 
creation itself  was a limitation (as we’ve discussed already; God creates a 
particular world and wills to be “God with us” and “God for us”) insofar as 
God determines to be in a certain relationship, and no other, to the created 
order. Case-Winters summarizes, “What this illustrates is that omnipotence, 
for Barth, does not exclude the possibility of  a voluntary self-limitation of  
power” (1990:108). Her critique of  these ideas in Barth is two-fold: (1) the 
notion of  God’s self-determination appears to be at odds with Barth’s view 
of  divine atemporality,21 and (2) self-limitation does not help with issues 
like evil, since God’s limitation is self-imposed and thus presumably could 
be withdrawn at any time in order to vanquish evil.
	 In	David	Ray	Griffin’s	 still-definitive	work	God, Power, and Evil, 
the focus is still the problem of  evil, but creation and DSL come up at 
even regular junctures. Here we will mention his critique of  Emil Brunner’s 
version of  DSL. Brunner’s position seems clear enough; God limits himself  
by creating: “The God of  revelation is…. the God who limits Himself, in 
order to create room for the creature…. The two ideas, Creation and self-
limitation, are correlative” (1952:172). Coming as he does from a process 
perspective,	Griffin	 has	 obvious	 disagreements	 with	 Brunner.	 But	 he	 is	
sympathetic to the notion of  creaturely existence causing God to limit 
himself.	Unfortunately,	Griffin’s	analysis	unveils	in	Brunner	a	wide-ranging	
and inconsistent development of  DSL, so much so that Brunner can rightly 
be considered a continuation of  the “unbridled omnipotence tradition” 
that only deviates from previous theologians so far as his obfuscating use 
of  DSL rhetoric allows. Brunner is found to be less than helpful, leaving 
the issues of  creation, creaturely freedom, and the problem of  evil, looming 
large:
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It seems evident that the only way for theology to meet 
its responsibility to help people reconcile their beliefs 
based upon revelation with the “facts which everyone 
can see,” as Brunner says should be done ([Dogmatics II] 
151), is to develop or adopt an understanding of  divine 
providential	influence	which	is	not	total	determination.	
And this means going beyond the issue of  semantics 
(Griffin	1976:230).
 
 
 
In	“going	beyond	the	issue	of 	semantics”	both	Griffin	and	Case-Winters	
propose	 process-influenced	 models	 of 	 providence,	 which	 necessarily	
entail a rejection of  creation out of  nothing and a belief  that God cannot 
determine	 anything	 unilaterally,	 but	 rather	must	work	 through	 influence	
and	persuasion	(Case-Winters	1990:206-232;	Griffin	1976:	261-310).
 When then is the underlying issue in these critiques of  DSL? It 
seems that in both Barth and Brunner, process and feminist commentators 
have not found incoherence in the notion of  DSL as such; what they have 
pinpointed instead is a lack of  consistency within theological outlooks that 
lay	claim	to	DSL.	Case-Winters	finds	divine	timelessness	and	DSL	to	be	
inconsistent,22	and	Griffin	detects	too	many	different	vocabularies	at	work	
in Brunner for DSL to truly be considered his governing paradigm.
These critiques are effective, and in both cases are so tightly 
bound to the texts of  both Barth and Brunner that they are nigh irrefutable. 
But they are both addressed to doctrinal and rhetorical lynchpins, which, 
fortunately, do not bind our current exploration. Divine atemporality is 
not a necessary part of  an orthodox doctrine of  God, and indeed has 
come under critique from thoroughly orthodox philosophers like Nicholas 
Wolterstorff  (2001:187-213) and others. In fact, and highly pertinent for 
our discussion here, Thomas Senor has convincingly demonstrated that a 
temporal conception of  God meshes quite effectively with a creation ex 
nihilo framework (1993:86-92). Brunner’s issue, that of  inconsistency, though 
always a risk when doing theology, seems well-resisted by Hans Jonas clear 
articulation of  power-as-power-in-relation and the thoroughgoing kenotic 
model of  Moltmann and others. Discussed apart from entangling notions 
like atemporality, and worked out consistently, creation out of  nothing by 
way of  God’s willing self-limitation appears to be a workable and fruitful 
theological expression.
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Conclusion: Triune and Relational Kenosis
First John tells us “God is love” (4:8). Following from what we 
have said so far, it can be concluded that God would still be love without the 
created order. This is a crucial distinction between the framework advocated 
in this essay and process theology. The inter-trinitarian love of  God has 
often been articulated in terms of  perichoresis, understood commonly as that 
“mutual indwelling” among the persons of  the Godhead which intones 
their unbreakable communion, fellowship, and alliance of  will. God’s 
essence	is	thus	both	loving	and	other-affirming,	insofar	as	each	person	of 	
the	Trinity	affirms	and	 loves	 the	other	persons.	Thomas	Thompson	and	
Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. write, “Few are the major statements on the Trinity 
today	that	do	not	find	in	[the	statement]	‘God	is	love’	a	most	compelling	
description of  and entrance into God’s trinitarian being and action in 
history” (2006:173). 
Several theologians over the past century have promoted the idea 
that the only coherent way to articulate such an outlook on the Trinity is 
to understand perichoresis as a kenotic interchange among the three persons. 
The	Father,	Son,	and	Holy	Spirit	embody	perfect	sacrifice	and	self-giving	
love, allowing each others’ will to, essentially, be their own will; the perfect 
example of  divine power that expresses itself  most clearly in loving, but 
limiting, relationship. “I came down from heaven not to do my own will, 
but the will of  him who sent me” (John 6:38)—Bulgakov very effectively 
highlights this example, among others, of  Christ kenotically willing in 
tandem with the Father’s will, thus offering us a picture of  the trinitarian 
relations (2008:283-285).  
In what does the limiting love of  Trinitarian relations consist? 
We can actually perceive them in even the most simplistic formulations 
of  the Trinity: “God is the Father, is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit. The 
Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, the Spirit is not the Father.” 
Every iteration of  “is not” constitutes a relational, and positive, limit. Thus 
the three persons of  the Trinity could be said to kenotically indwell one 
another in the divine life, but do so by willing self-limitation.23
 This understanding of  God’s immanent, relational nature helps us 
recognize creation out of  nothing not only as a demonstration of  his power, 
but also as a revelation of  his character. Just as God the Son embraces 
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kenosis in his human incarnation, willingly submits himself  to the will of  
the	Father,	and	sacrifices	himself 	for	the	sake	of 	sinful	others,24 so too does 
the	trinitarian	act	of 	creation	reveal	God’s	willingness	to	sacrifice,	and	in	
that	sacrifice	bring	about	true	relationship.	
What is thus ironic about theological critiques of  creatio ex nihilo 
(whether they arise from process, feminist, or other theological outlooks) is 
their failure to realize that—if  understood in terms of  kenosis and God’s 
free self-limitation—creation out of  nothing points to a God who is more 
relational,	more	loving,	more	other-affirming,	than	what	we	find	within	the	
proposed alternative conceptions. We do not see in creation the tyrannical 
emperor God of  revisionist theology’s caricature; instead we see a Creator 
who in his very act of  creating preludes the servanthood of  Christ and who 
gives all good gifts to his creation (Moltmann 1985:78,88).25
And, on the other side, rather than reducing God, making God 
weak, or collapsing his sovereignty, a kenotic understanding of  creatio ex 
nihilo opens the door for understanding God’s power as power-within-
relationship, power that is gifted to God’s image bearers wherein “the 
selflessness	of 	love	reflects	vulnerability,	a	giving	of 	power	to	the	beloved”	
(Wisniewski 2003:11). The world in its brokenness only understands power 
in terms of  domination and control, but God’s wisdom makes this wisdom 
into	foolishness:	the	sacrificial	power	of 	love	serves	as	a	basis	for	both	the	
creation and redemption of  the world, and this overcomes all other alleged 
powers (Matera 1999:93-95).
God is absolutely free, and in his freedom he willingly creates a 
world from nothing, and in that creative act enters into a relationship with 
that world. Thus, we can say that it is true, yet not enough, to say that God 
“created out of  nothing.” And it is also true, yet not enough, to say that 
God “created out of  freedom.” We must to both of  these add: “for the 
sake of  love.”
Endnotes
 1 Buber’s I and Thou and Levinas’ Otherwise than Being are representative, 
and now classic, articulations of  the ethical imperative that is leveraged by such an 
understanding of  self  and “other.”
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 2 For exemplary theological work being done in direct dialogue with such 
concerns, see the series of  essays: James Smith & Henry Isaac Venema, eds. The 
Hermeneutics of  Charity: Interpretation, Selfhood, and Postmodern Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos Press, 2004); for other examples across the theological spectrum see Amos 
Yong’s Hospitality and the Other (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), focusing on 
Christian practice and pluralism; Mary Fulkerson, Places of  Redemption: Theology for 
a Worldly Church (Oxford, 2007), focusing on ecclesiology); Tina Beattie, Theology 
after Postmodernity: Divining the Void—A Lacanian Reading of  Thomas Aquinas (Oxford, 
forthcoming [2013]), focusing on historical theology and Thomistic themes; and 
Jan-Olav Henriksen, Desire, Gift, and Recognition: Christology and Postmodern Philosophy 
(Eerdmans Publishing, 2009).
 3	 “The	 widespread	 influence	 of 	 Whitehead	 on	 feminism	 in	 North	
America	reflects	a	disjunctive	but	analogous	attraction	to	a	language	that	honors	its	
own	poetic	edges,	where	women	find	expressive	options	beyond	emulation	of 	the	
andromorphic	subject	or	surrender	to	objectification,”	in	Keller,	“The	Process	of 	
Difference, the Difference of  Process,” in Keller, Process and Difference, 28n.37. See 
also Ellen K. Feder et al., eds. Derrida and Feminism: Recasting the Question of  Woman 
(London: Routledge, 1997).
 4	David	Ray	Griffin	makes	a	similar	point,	detailing	what	he	says	as	the	
problematic dimensions of  theology articulated in light of  God’s omnipotence. See 
God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Louisville, KN: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2004 ed. [1976]), esp. chapters 17 and 18.
 
 5 This statement might be challenged by those of  strongly Reformed 
persuasions who wish to maintain God only ever does anything for himself—or 
for his “glory.” To those with such objections, another full-blown essay, or perhaps 
a	 book,	 would	 be	 in	 order	 to	make	 some	 significant	 counter-points.	 I	 will	 here	
broach two initial thoughts: (1) Logically, there is no contradiction between God 
creating “for himself ” and creating “for the sake of  the created”—God’s creative 
acting is perfectly capable of  shouldering both aspects; they are not in contradiction 
to one another, especially if  one has a robust understanding of  the imago Dei in 
which	humanity	reflects	aspects	of 	God	and	furthers	God’s	own	mission	(and	thus,	
God’s own glory). (2) I would make reference to the following, which have done 
admirable jobs explicating different dimensions of  God’s role as generous giver 
for the sake of  others: Terrence Fretheim, The Suffering of  God: An Old Testament 
Perspective (Fortress Press, 1984), esp. Ch. 9; Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community 
of  God (Broadman and Holman/Eerdmans Publishing, 2000 [1994]), 99-108. Kelly 
Kapic	has	presented	an	accessible	(and	Reformed)	perspective	which	affirms	that	
though God is the ultimate free cause of  creation, the creation was birthed in order 
to allow human beings to participate in fellowship with God and to celebrate the 
goodness of  his world. These things may glorify God, but the world was not created 
solely “for God”—as Kapic states, “God’s ownership [of  creation] is much more 
dynamic than we might expect… God does not own by keeping, but by giving” (For 
God So Loved, He Gave: Entering the Movement of  Divine Generosity (Zondervan, 2011), 
24, see further 17-29.
 6 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Chs. 17-18; Augustine, City of  God, Book XI, 
Chs. 4-6; Anselm, Proslogion, Ch. 5; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 44-49. Cf. Richard, 
Christ the Self-Emptying of  God, 128-132. Further, “Creation in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition cannot have any preceding condition; it cannot follow on anything else. In 
its	uniqueness	it	is	in	every	respect	‘for	the	first	time”	(ibid.,	128-29).
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 7 And emanationism and pantheism, for good measure.
 8 Moltmann makes this point even more succinctly and cogently in his 
“God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of  the World,” in The Work 
of  Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2001), 137ff., esp. 144-148.
 9 This is not to say that all three of  these more “monarchical” attributes 
of  God cannot be understood relationally based on the biblical witness. However, 
the ways in which such things appear in traditional Christian discourse do on 
occasion	reduce	the	other-affirming	nature	of 	God’s	agape for creation.
 10 See also the forceful articulation of  these themes in George Hendry, 
“Nothing,” Theology Today 39.3 (1982): 287-288: “Creation…implies a certain self-
limitation, or self-negation on the part of  God. God as being does not wish to 
monopolize the whole of  being, he does not regard it as an inalienable prerogative; 
he relinquishes some of  it to another….”
 11 Paul R. Sponheim says that it only seems to add “another layer of  
mystery” with little constructive value (The Pulse of  Creation: God and the Transformation 
of  the World [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999], 20). Chan Ho Park has recently 
offered some of  the best examinations of  Moltmann’s panentheism and related 
motifs, giving a thoroughgoing but fair critical evaluation in his Transcendence and 
Spatiality of  the Triune Creator (Peter Lang, 2005), esp. 118-123.
 12 “Now we being to see what a large measure of  self-limitation He has 
imposed upon Himself, and how far He has emptied Himself… [when] a creature 
which has misused its creaturely freedom to such an extent as to defy God. The 
kenosis, which reaches its paradoxical climax in the Cross of  Christ, began with the 
Creation of  the world” Brunner, Dogmatics II, 20. Moltmann builds on this notion 
to	tie	together	a	multitude	of 	themes:	In	creating,	God	first	creates	a	nothingness,	a	
non-God space, in which creation exists. This non-God space would be completely 
devoid of  God, and thus would be rightly considered death, hell, non-being, etc. It 
is in the midst of  that space that God brings about creation. And after his creation 
falls into sin, turning toward non-God reality, it is Christ who will embrace the 
non-being	of 	sin	and	death	for	the	sake	of 	that	broken	creation.	Christ’s	sacrificial	
plunge back into nothingness thus inaugurates a “new” creation, mirroring the initial 
kenotic act of  creatio ex nihilo by the kenosis on the cross. (See God in Creation, 91-
93.) Though there can be, and often are, disagreements with Moltmann’s overall 
program, the constructive theological horizon opened by such a formulation is 
fascinating.
 
 13 It should be noted that McFague is careful to use “model” as the 
designation for her more panentheistic view of  the God-world relationship, thus 
sparing herself  from defending any position dogmatically. She is, however, resolute 
in her denunciation of  creation out of  nothing.
 14 We may balk at this “decision” or “enacting” language, and some have 
argued that creation is actually something intrinsic to the nature of  the Creator 
God. Such a line of  reasoning problematically, and quite directly, leads us to any 
number of  Neo-Platonic emanationist paradigms (Moltmann offers Paul Tillich as 
a representative of  this trajectory [God in Creation, 80]).
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 15 Admittedly, Moltmann’s work presented some ambiguity on this score, 
see the incisive comments by Chan Ho Park, Transcendence and Spatiality, 108-112. 
Critiques of  Moltmann focusing majorly on his panentheism are also informative 
here: see, e.g., Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross: An Analytic Look at the Problem of  Pain 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1994), 72-76;  John W. Cooper, Panentheism: 
The Other God of  the Philosophers (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 237-258. 
 16 The Lamb of  God, 120. Though he critiques Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
viewpoints here, Bulgakov goes on to argue, along a different route, that God could 
not have chosen not to create (120ff.). This point, similar to how it is made by 
Moltmann, seems to be that as Creator, God’s creative love compels him to creative 
acts. This is not born of  any need, but of  an essential and voluntary movement.
 
 17 Richard, Christ the Self-Emptying of  God, 130-131. Language, however, 
might be a stumbling block here. Paul Fiddes has recently attempted to articulate 
how	God’s	 “needs”	might	be	“satisfied”	by	 a	 loving	 relationship	with	 the	world	
without	implying	any	“deficiency	in	God”	or	“limit	on	divine	freedom”	(“Creation	
Out of  Love,” in Polkinghorne, 169ff.). Whether or not Fiddes’ argument succeeds 
is an open question, but it represents an important attempt to claim such language 
within a more orthodox framework than process theology.
 18 The full passage read: “The creation of  heaven and earth…is, in 
relation to Divinity itself, a voluntary self-diminution, a metaphysical kenosis. 
Alongside His absolute being, God establishes a relative being with which he enters 
into an interrelation, being God and Creator for this being. The creative ‘let there 
be,’ which is the command of  God’s omnipotence, at the same time expresses the 
sacrifice	 of 	Divine	 love,	 of 	God’s	 love	 for	 the	world,”	 (The Lamb of  God, 128). 
 19 Further, “God’s Word an action are certainly indispensable, but 
the	 future	of 	 the	 created	order	 is	made	dependent	 in	 significant	ways	 upon	 the	
creaturely use of  power. This, of  course, entails a self-limitation with respect to 
divine sovereignty…” (74).
 20 There are also notable critiques of  DSL from more traditional 
theological	 perspectives;	 e.g.	 Ron	 Highfield,	 “The	 Function	 of 	 Divine	 Self-
Limitation in Open Theism: Great Wall or Picket Fence?” Journal of  the Evangelical 
Theological Society. 45/2 (June 2002): 279–99; idem., “Divine Self-Limitation in the 
Theology of  Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 
Vol.	32.1	(Fall	2002):	49-71.	I	sadly	lack	the	space	to	address	Highfield’s	brand	of 	
concerns in this essay, but hope to pursue them in future work.
 21 She incisively asks, “Who, in fact, was there making the choice to be 
“with and for” the human being? Such choice would have to have been made by 
some other nature not characterized by this limitation” (God’s Power, 108, emphasis in 
original). She further notes that the determination, to be made coherent at all, must 
introduce a “before” and “after” into God.
 22 Case-Winters, as noted above, also thinks that DSL, incoherently, could 
be withdrawn at any time in order to conquer evil. This is an odd critique, since 
the prerogative to withdraw the limitation, when exercised, would contradict the 
intentions of  said limitation; if  the limitation is real, then withdrawing it, though 
within the scope of  divine power, would clearly not be within the scope of  the divine 
willing. The vanquishing of  evil is apparently willed by God to proceed along other 
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lines, rather than his unilateral annihilation of  it. Furthermore, the withdrawing of  
DSL,	if 	it	is	DSL	that	allows	creation	“to	be”	in	the	first	place,	would	constitute	not	
only the destruction of  evil in the universe, but also the whole of  the created order 
itself.
 23 On the notion of  kenosis and love in the midst of  this social 
perichoresis, see Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 158-176; Bulgakov, The Lamb 
of  God, 264ff. Obviously, much of  this discussion will be challenged at the outset 
by those opposed to social trinitarian models. I have not the space to articulate 
a full defense of  such models here, but see Thompson and Plantinga, “Trinity 
and Kenosis,” 172-189, see also J. Scott Horrell, “Toward a Biblical Model of  the 
Social Trinity,” Journal of  the Evangelical Theological Society Vol. 47.3 (September 2004): 
399–421; also Stanley Grenz, Theology for the Community of  God, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2000 ed.), 65-76, and Miroslav Volf  After Our Likeness: The 
Church as the Image of  the Trinity (Eerdmans, 1998), esp. 76ff.
 24 Kenotic christology has seen a remarkable renaissance in the last 
decade, and that renaissance has served as part of  the impetus of  this present study. 
Two	of 	the	most	significant	works	demonstrating	both	the	theological	acumen	of 	
kenoticism’s	supporters	and	the	myriad	fields	of 	theology	which	it	informs	are:	(1)	
C. Stephen Evans, ed., Exploring Kenotic Christology (Oxford University Press, 2006), 
and (2) David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the Construction of  a Christian 
Theology (Baylor University Press, 2011).  See also the inter-disciplinary work by 
Jeffrey Keuss, Freedom of  the Self: Kenosis, Cultural Identity, and Mission at the Crossroads 
(Wipf  & Stock, 2010). Moltmann’s The Crucified God and Bulgakov’s The Lamb of  God 
remain	powerful	contemporary	interpretations	with	wide	influence.
 25 I have called upon Moltmann’s thought throughout this paper, but I do 
so critically. Moltmann’s “broad place” in theological dialogue allows his articulate 
theological innovativeness to lend itself  to appropriation by disparate positions, and 
his thought certainly morphed over time and through his interactions with various 
schools and thinkers.
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